The notion of doctrine in the military has gone from a base lattice work from which to build, to the superstructure. The base of course being basic small unit tactics, communication and uniform regulations. So let's talk about the now supposed superstructure of the military. Everything is based around what is, and what is, is just good enough. The 5.56 is little more than a varmint round, yes it can do the job, but so can slingers, and those haven't been around for a long long time. The venerable .30cal round has been around since forever, and the ballistics table take most any and all guess work out of the round, minus a few planetoid factors and atmospherics if you shoot far enough to make that matter.
The doctrine of the military is such that they just add to the existing structure, to fit the narrative of this war, or that war. And that is why we fight the last war, and that is why all training in post war as far as infantry maneuver tactics, and why good ships are somehow "obsolete" are all failed examples of what is correct. How am I right?
Last war we fought and won is WWII. Nothing that is doctrine today, including the civilian "leadership" of the military is a functional entity. The body count way of deciding victory against an enemy for example is a failed ideology of the way to victory. Especially when considering the haj, whose ranks swell with zealots, and not paid mercenaries for a state. Yes, I was one, and that is what a paid soldier is by every definition. The hand over of a conquered nation to the ingenious population, to quell their concerns over occupation has been proven to be a failed example of p.c doctrine. If we are going to take the time to invade a nation and solve THEIR PROBLEMS, colonization is the only answer to ensure our ideology takes over.
Look at what India was, and it is now the help center for NASA space program...
So now we have some examples of failed doctrine concerning ideology and methodology, we can look at the Grendel;
1) The bullet is slower than the 5.56
2) It is a non standard, non NATO bullet.
3) Less carrying capacity in magazines, and thus over all.
4) Weapons must be refit.
I will stick with these basic 4 examples and talk about how it can be fixed through doctrine over hauls and the basic understanding of doctrine.
1) The slower bullet of the Grendel will confuse not the testing soldiers maybe, but the head-shed in political arm of the military. The pentagon. Big number to them means more effective, when talking about MV, never mind about BC or KE. The only number they done want to see high is dead and wounded, and that's a good thing, but their observance of the religion of doctrine also makes this impossible.
A slower moving, but inherently more accurate bullet, with more inherent KE because of the BC would do several things. Flatter shooters are easier to teach non shooters how to shoot with.
The doctrine of military is such that a full month is devoted to BRM. Imagine that month being used to teach still, but being able to add in so basic ballistics education of the bullet, and maybe teach soldiers a bit about cover. However teaching ballistic to the equivalent of bullet sponges is seen as too aggressive a learning curve for most combat arms jobs, minus the artillery field.
The fix is to be forward thinking and understand that the metallurgy is going to get better, powders are going to get better and the ar15 will not always be around. They have for years been looking for a suitable replacement, they will find one, and why not have a weapon that can shoot a more efficient round when they do?
2) As a part of NATO we like to have a stream line supply chain with our allies.
I say screw them, NATO is a defunct, and radically anti west organization that we have no business being a part of. End of story. If they want us to fight, they need to pay our republic for its support.
3) The u.s has largely gotten over its "rifleman" roots, and has instead transitioned into NAZI style blitzkrieg style attacks. While the U.S rifleman defeated the NAZI in WWII for many reasons, the rifleman first approach no doubt saved many a troop from the buzz saw.
An inherently accurate bullet with rifleman tactics would reduce the need for so many magazines in the first place for one, and two, most units I talked to only carried 26-28 bullets in their chewed up, used up magazines in the first place, unless they bought their own P-mags.
The notion of violence of action is not without its merits, and is in fact a fine strategy....For highly trained special operations troops or Marines. The Army is an overwhelming, occupation force, whose best served using siege warfare, or being besieged from a fixed position. This prospect is not without merit also, based on the firepower and ability to then resupply beleaguered troops.
Trying to created fast accurate shooters in tight quarters. Well, for those who would argue that is the way of warfare today, then argue against the impossible task of mass producing SF troops. Well, the Job of Delta was originally hostage rescue type missions. Fast acting, fast shooting in tight quarters troops. Oops...
The U.S military was founded on the basis of riflemen, snipers/DM's did play their small party in the Revolutionary war and civil war, but those are simply highly specialized, highly trained riflemen.
Therefor, the U.S military needs to fund small unit tactics training, and the army needs to incorporate 500m targets on their rifle range if and when the Grendel ever becomes adopted. And yes I understand the nonlinear battle field, I have studied Doctrine and historical battle data for 30 years. You don't win against insurgencies with force. It doesn't happen.
4) The fitting of new barrels, bolts and muzzle devices to the existing M16A2/M4(whatever iteration) to exiting weapons platforms is far, far cheaper than getting all new weapons, which the Grendel pretty much provides. I would suggest a basic MTOE update to all combat arms, which would include a 24" barrel 1 or 2 for each squad, and they would be the designated marksmen. The DM's would then provide accurate cover fire from a greater than average distance than most common weapons on the modern battlefield. All this, using the same bullet, but the DM's would have the ability to reload their own bullets.
The squads of a platoon would now have to function more independently from the whole, which has been partially realized, but not fully. The commanders often want to overtly control their men, and the way in which an operation is conducted. This poor leadership leads to a a confinement of action, and adaptability of the riflemen.
The squad leaders should fall under the direct command of the squad leaders who take mission updates from the platoon sergeant, and the commander updating the higher headquarters as to the progress of their battle space, and handing down intel/updates from higher to the platoon sergeant. The commander is therefor relegated to the appropriate position of commanding overall, troops actions based upon mission parameters, and the platoon sergeant is functionally in charge of ground actions.
Why is this doctrinal change required? Because a rifleman who cannot act upon his intuition and training is not a functional rifleman. The commander outside the war-zone has a duty to ensure his men are trained in the basic doctrinal way of conducting actions on the ground. In the war-zone the commander when his men are not forward deployed has a duty to ensure his sergeants maintain combat readiness(training/medical/intel updates) so his constant mothering is not needed during a fight. This is not the case in MANY MANY units.
Also as a parting shot, doctrine is supposed to be a basic understanding of the ideas involved in TTPs. Doctrine is not supposed to be a restrictive documentation of how actions are conducted.
And these are he problems and solutions, AS I SEE THEM. It's all an uphill fight for anything new, and the control mechanism in place are far too restrictive for the military to be effective enough to actually win any fight, with "cavemen" or otherwise.
The doctrine of the military is such that they just add to the existing structure, to fit the narrative of this war, or that war. And that is why we fight the last war, and that is why all training in post war as far as infantry maneuver tactics, and why good ships are somehow "obsolete" are all failed examples of what is correct. How am I right?
Last war we fought and won is WWII. Nothing that is doctrine today, including the civilian "leadership" of the military is a functional entity. The body count way of deciding victory against an enemy for example is a failed ideology of the way to victory. Especially when considering the haj, whose ranks swell with zealots, and not paid mercenaries for a state. Yes, I was one, and that is what a paid soldier is by every definition. The hand over of a conquered nation to the ingenious population, to quell their concerns over occupation has been proven to be a failed example of p.c doctrine. If we are going to take the time to invade a nation and solve THEIR PROBLEMS, colonization is the only answer to ensure our ideology takes over.
Look at what India was, and it is now the help center for NASA space program...
So now we have some examples of failed doctrine concerning ideology and methodology, we can look at the Grendel;
1) The bullet is slower than the 5.56
2) It is a non standard, non NATO bullet.
3) Less carrying capacity in magazines, and thus over all.
4) Weapons must be refit.
I will stick with these basic 4 examples and talk about how it can be fixed through doctrine over hauls and the basic understanding of doctrine.
1) The slower bullet of the Grendel will confuse not the testing soldiers maybe, but the head-shed in political arm of the military. The pentagon. Big number to them means more effective, when talking about MV, never mind about BC or KE. The only number they done want to see high is dead and wounded, and that's a good thing, but their observance of the religion of doctrine also makes this impossible.
A slower moving, but inherently more accurate bullet, with more inherent KE because of the BC would do several things. Flatter shooters are easier to teach non shooters how to shoot with.
The doctrine of military is such that a full month is devoted to BRM. Imagine that month being used to teach still, but being able to add in so basic ballistics education of the bullet, and maybe teach soldiers a bit about cover. However teaching ballistic to the equivalent of bullet sponges is seen as too aggressive a learning curve for most combat arms jobs, minus the artillery field.
The fix is to be forward thinking and understand that the metallurgy is going to get better, powders are going to get better and the ar15 will not always be around. They have for years been looking for a suitable replacement, they will find one, and why not have a weapon that can shoot a more efficient round when they do?
2) As a part of NATO we like to have a stream line supply chain with our allies.
I say screw them, NATO is a defunct, and radically anti west organization that we have no business being a part of. End of story. If they want us to fight, they need to pay our republic for its support.
3) The u.s has largely gotten over its "rifleman" roots, and has instead transitioned into NAZI style blitzkrieg style attacks. While the U.S rifleman defeated the NAZI in WWII for many reasons, the rifleman first approach no doubt saved many a troop from the buzz saw.
An inherently accurate bullet with rifleman tactics would reduce the need for so many magazines in the first place for one, and two, most units I talked to only carried 26-28 bullets in their chewed up, used up magazines in the first place, unless they bought their own P-mags.
The notion of violence of action is not without its merits, and is in fact a fine strategy....For highly trained special operations troops or Marines. The Army is an overwhelming, occupation force, whose best served using siege warfare, or being besieged from a fixed position. This prospect is not without merit also, based on the firepower and ability to then resupply beleaguered troops.
Trying to created fast accurate shooters in tight quarters. Well, for those who would argue that is the way of warfare today, then argue against the impossible task of mass producing SF troops. Well, the Job of Delta was originally hostage rescue type missions. Fast acting, fast shooting in tight quarters troops. Oops...
The U.S military was founded on the basis of riflemen, snipers/DM's did play their small party in the Revolutionary war and civil war, but those are simply highly specialized, highly trained riflemen.
Therefor, the U.S military needs to fund small unit tactics training, and the army needs to incorporate 500m targets on their rifle range if and when the Grendel ever becomes adopted. And yes I understand the nonlinear battle field, I have studied Doctrine and historical battle data for 30 years. You don't win against insurgencies with force. It doesn't happen.
4) The fitting of new barrels, bolts and muzzle devices to the existing M16A2/M4(whatever iteration) to exiting weapons platforms is far, far cheaper than getting all new weapons, which the Grendel pretty much provides. I would suggest a basic MTOE update to all combat arms, which would include a 24" barrel 1 or 2 for each squad, and they would be the designated marksmen. The DM's would then provide accurate cover fire from a greater than average distance than most common weapons on the modern battlefield. All this, using the same bullet, but the DM's would have the ability to reload their own bullets.
The squads of a platoon would now have to function more independently from the whole, which has been partially realized, but not fully. The commanders often want to overtly control their men, and the way in which an operation is conducted. This poor leadership leads to a a confinement of action, and adaptability of the riflemen.
The squad leaders should fall under the direct command of the squad leaders who take mission updates from the platoon sergeant, and the commander updating the higher headquarters as to the progress of their battle space, and handing down intel/updates from higher to the platoon sergeant. The commander is therefor relegated to the appropriate position of commanding overall, troops actions based upon mission parameters, and the platoon sergeant is functionally in charge of ground actions.
Why is this doctrinal change required? Because a rifleman who cannot act upon his intuition and training is not a functional rifleman. The commander outside the war-zone has a duty to ensure his men are trained in the basic doctrinal way of conducting actions on the ground. In the war-zone the commander when his men are not forward deployed has a duty to ensure his sergeants maintain combat readiness(training/medical/intel updates) so his constant mothering is not needed during a fight. This is not the case in MANY MANY units.
Also as a parting shot, doctrine is supposed to be a basic understanding of the ideas involved in TTPs. Doctrine is not supposed to be a restrictive documentation of how actions are conducted.
And these are he problems and solutions, AS I SEE THEM. It's all an uphill fight for anything new, and the control mechanism in place are far too restrictive for the military to be effective enough to actually win any fight, with "cavemen" or otherwise.
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