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Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-13-2014
Hey, go for it. But, if other people are going to discuss guns and ammo, don't expect me to sit out.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - nincomp - 04-14-2014
JASmith Wrote:We seem to have gotten bogged down in the morass of caliber-specific arguments and have lost sight of the basic question.
Let's reset with a summary of the Gen III capable assets as listed above.
Damn, I had spent almost an hour addressing the aforementioned morass of caliber specific arguments. It was brilliant, brilliant, I tell you. - BUT IT IS GONE. Damn you timeout function (automatic logout when a post has not been sent in an unreasonably short amount of time)!
Many of my opinions are influenced by working in North Africa for a couple of years. The terrain within 50 miles included rocky desert, mountains and wooded forest. During the summer, there was a constant haze over the landscape that reduced visibility some. Windstorms occurred often. By contrast, on many winter days, the air was so clear that we could clearly see the mountain range over 30 miles away.
From what I have seen, it looks like many areas in the Middle East. It is entirely possible that counter-insurgency actions would occur in an area with some similar features. Depending upon the weather conditions of a particular day, it would not be difficult to set up long-range ambushes.
Shoulder-fired weapons with an effective range much less than a PK-family machine gun would be at a significant disadvantage. In this case, weapons with a GPC-like range would prove useful. It is important to note that our 7.62x51 MMGs only come close to matching the range of their 7.62x54R adversaries. In order to achieve an overmatch, something more along the lines of a .338 NM* would be required. This is why I see a .338 weapon in the MMG role, if any.
The 50 BMG remains the HMG.
If we adopt longer ranged weapons, how would our adversaries adapt? Our enemies are not stupid and will try to take advantage of our weaknesses. A good example of this is the trend to attack from beyond the effective range of our 5.56x45 weapons. What would they do this time?
To address the issue of man-portable long-range HE weapons, we need something between the SMAW and the Javelin. The Javelin is a high-tech and expensive anti-tank weapon. A hell of a lot of Javelins have been used, but I don't see no dead tanks.
There might be something like this already in the pipeline.
Organic surveillance:
Needed immediately: The troops need a portable device to locate the source of incoming enemy fire. As stupid as it may seem, I have yet to see any battle footage where our soldiers could see over or around their cover. I have seen helmet cam videos of the machine gunner popping up and spraying a significant portion of Afghanistan because he has no idea where the enemy fire is coming from. Hell, periscopes were common in WWI. Our guys have helmet cams to watch each other but no "enemy cams" or even simple periscopes to spot the enemy shooting at them. If a "lipstick" camera has sufficient resolution, it would be difficult to spot. If nothing else, buy a bunch of IPhones and hand them out.
Of course, an acoustic device that could determine the shooter's position would be very helpful.
Link to overhead surveillance: This may not strictly fall into the "organic" category, but it could be used in the field.
Limited usefulness/needs work: There are small drones that can send back images. How resistant they are to signal jamming, I do not know. The hand launched ones that I have seen fly so slowly as to be useless in a significant crosswind or headwind.
One of the drones (switchblade?) carries a camera and a small payload of ordnance. If spotted, it would seem to be an easy target for any skeet shooter. I am not kidding.
* The .338 Norma Magnum has a shorter case than the Lapua Magnum, but allows longer bullets to be used. This provides more options for bullet shape and composition.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - JASmith - 04-14-2014
The sensor discussion is a move in a good direction.
I am aware of several different concepts for accomplishing the organic sense and surveillance task but, in deference to the aim of starting with big picture and then zooming into the critical details, will try to avoid discussing them until we've done the first chores.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-14-2014
nincomp Wrote:Shoulder-fired weapons with an effective range much less than a PK-family machine gun would be at a significant disadvantage. In this case, weapons with a GPC-like range would prove useful. In order to achieve an overmatch, something more along the lines of a .338 NM* would be required.It depends on how much overmatch is desired. Something like 6.5x47 Lapua or 6.5 Creedmoor ought to provide overmatch, but with potentially lighter weapon weight than for .338 NM.
That's one thing that bothers me about the GPC. It may only provide parity, but the Army typically espouses overmatching capability.
Quote:Needed immediately: The troops need a portable device to locate the source of incoming enemy fire. As stupid as it may seem, I have yet to see any battle footage where our soldiers could see over or around their cover.That's surprising, because there are many videos showing soldiers looking over or around their cover. (There seem to be an astonishing number of mud brick walls in Afghanistan!) Here's one:
[video=youtube;ncxkFzaBqPo]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncxkFzaBqPo[/video]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncxkFzaBqPo
Quote:Hell, periscopes were common in WWI. Our guys have helmet cams to watch each other but no "enemy cams" or even simple periscopes to spot the enemy shooting at them.WWI was a static war, with soldiers in trenches where periscopes were in stationary positions. They weren't carried by troops on patrols or raids.
I'm inclined to think that small, easily-portable periscopes wouldn't help much. As in the video above, soldiers having a clear view often can't see the enemy. Perhaps FLIR might work?
Considerations on the Evolution of War - JASmith - 04-14-2014
This thread has the title Considerations on the Evolution of War and the original post has no mention of defining specific cartridges.
It is OK for now to discuss what an adversary might bring against us. Jumping in with ideas about specific cartridges and weapons we might adopt distracts from attaining the objective of defining what they must do, e. g.:
- target ranges (including span of ranges and frequency of occurence)
- ability to identify targets
- consequences of collateral damage
- terminal performance needs
- accuracy needs
- etc.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-14-2014
nincomp Wrote:One of the drones (switchblade?) carries a camera and a small payload of ordnance. If spotted, it would seem to be an easy target for any skeet shooter.Maybe. Maybe not.
[video=youtube;E7YOet6jl-M]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7YOet6jl-M[/video]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7YOet6jl-M
[video=youtube;54WMpVDDiII]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54WMpVDDiII[/video]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54WMpVDDiII
Considerations on the Evolution of War - LRRPF52 - 04-14-2014
JASmith Wrote:We seem to have gotten bogged down in the morass of caliber-specific arguments and have lost sight of the basic question.
Let's reset with a summary of the Gen III capable assets as listed above.
Then let's refine our mental pictures of what small-unit operations in Gen IV our troops would likely see. We already know differences exist but let's see of we can spell them out. One of the specific questions to be explored is whether these troops will look like Spec Ops forces with significant latitude in weapons drawn for missions or more like line troops with limited training and little or no options for weapons beyond standard issue.
Last for this thread anyway, would be a qualitative description of what that small unit needs if it is built on the Spec Ops model or one the line unit model.
Only after fleshing these questions out can we embark on meaningful discussions of calibers, cartridges, and so on.
This really cuts to the heart of the discussion. If the military just attempts to adapt to the taskings without fundamentally adapting doctrine and force flexibility, it doesn't matter what calibers are issued-they're going to go in unprepared, and a small minority of real performers will have to fight the organization and the enemy simultaneously.
If the organization miraculously focuses on doctrine, training, and true professional development, with the flexibility to tailor the force, they will efficiently get it done with existing systems in inventory. A new toy might make one marginal aspect of the huge pie taste a bit better, but it will still be a certain flavor of pie, barely distinguishable from the other.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - nincomp - 04-14-2014
stanc Wrote:That's surprising, because there are many videos showing soldiers looking over or around their cover. (There seem to be an astonishing number of mud brick walls in Afghanistan!)
Sorry. I meant looking over or around cover without exposing themselves to enemy fire. I believe that you have posted at least one video in which enemy rounds were impacting near the soldiers. Something to allow a safe view around or over the mud brick wall would have been useful in that situation.
I mentioned the periscopes partly in jest. You have to admit, though, that launching a torpedo towards the enemy would be pretty cool.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - Michael - 04-14-2014
LRRPF52 Wrote:This really cuts to the heart of the discussion. If the military just attempts to adapt to the taskings without fundamentally adapting doctrine and force flexibility, it doesn't matter what calibers are issued-they're going to go in unprepared, and a small minority of real performers will have to fight the organization and the enemy simultaneously.
If the organization miraculously focuses on doctrine, training, and true professional development, with the flexibility to tailor the force, they will efficiently get it done with existing systems in inventory. A new toy might make one marginal aspect of the huge pie taste a bit better, but it will still be a certain flavor of pie, barely distinguishable from the other.
True statements, and –in my mind - part of what the discussion was initially posed to address. Where does the military need to go IOT remain relevant, effective and proactive in the future (above and beyond shiny new toys)? There are a lot of competing issues/training priorities for the time of the folks in uniform. The argument can be made, and the one that I think most will ascribe to, that combat efficiency/effectiveness should be paramount at the expense of everything else. This means lots of field training, live fire training, off site training deployments etc., etc.
Now here's the BUTs -
A saying in the military (or at least my service) is we recruit individuals, but we retain families. How do you retain a solid family life in a profession that demands the highest level of martial excellence - a time consuming endeavor - and then combine it with the attributes of morally and ethically sound leadership with a regional understanding of a professional academic? It is an exceeding rare individual who can maintain a healthy family life with the operational tempo that is required for true martial excellence – a tempo that may have that warrior home for less than a month each year.
How do you balance all the other training and education that is expected of the military that has very little to do with martial excellence? How many evolutions are dictated by Congress, DoD, the individual service chief or the President that take time away from that warfighting excellence? Like it or not, these chuckleheads control the purse strings to make the warfighting training possible. The hours spent in classrooms to learn about sexual assault and prevention, suicide awareness and prevention, operational risk management are – whether you want to admit it or not – important to maintain the healthy, ethical force this country deserves.
How do you adjust the training at ALL levels to be proficient at the myriad of different styles/situations/generations of conflict that may be faced? Do you train, staff, equip and rely on unit A to be proficient at situation Y, while unit B is proficient at situation X? What happens when situation Y drags on for years or unit B takes casualties that degrades its combat effectiveness? Do you now put a unit in a scenario they are not adequately trained to be effective? And what happens if both situations occur simultaneously (a twist on the two war strategy)? Or do you make all units marginally familiar in all situations and hope for the best?
The questions above are what plague most leaders who give a s%$t. You want to train & bring your kids home at the end of a deployment in one piece, but you also want to give them time prior to the deployment to have a home to come back to.
It ain't all trigger time.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - LRRPF52 - 04-14-2014
My answer is that the basic soldiering skill sets need to be trained in adolescence, in a long-term warrior development track that is decided early, not when you are 18-25yrs old. For the soft skills MOS's, that's fine, but not warriors.
In my first week of basic training, I beat one of my Drill Sergeants in disassembly and reassembly of the M16A2 rifle. That shouldn't have been possible, but was an indication of how seriously I had been taking my chosen career path. He was a Desert Storm veteran, had 14 years of service as an 11M, and had been trained by 10th Special Forces Group in one of their Battalion-run Sniper courses in Germany, where he was also stationed at the time with his mech unit.
A senior Staff Sergent in a combat arms unit who has been living with M16A2's his whole career should not be able to be beaten by some punk kid off the street. That is unacceptable for a number of reasons I can think, but respect is at the top of my list. How do I take my instructor seriously if I'm already more proficient than him on one basic task in the first week of initial entry training? In the back of my mind, I'm thinking, "Does this guy know what he's doing?"
If units inherit young men who are already extremely well-versed in basic soldiering skills, like:
* Marksmanship
* Physical Fitness
* First Aid
* Land Navigation
* Small Unit Tactics
* Common Soldier Tasks
....then that opens up so much time for units to train on collective tasks, while making it easy to maintain and improve upon the baseline that has been established in youth. For those that say it's too lofty, or too early, I give you this one simple example:
[video=youtube;LrxjYfl05ek]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrxjYfl05ek[/video]
Now take whatever learning modality they used to reach this level of proficiency, and apply it to the basic soldiering skills I listed above. Only the private sector can really cover down on this in the US, since the government will screw it up with PC and general limp-wristedness. Russia accomplishes it in their school system because threats and intimidation are perfectly welcomed, and I have witnessed it with their Olympic teams during training sessions.
I prefer rewards using the other end of Pavlovian method.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-14-2014
LRRPF52 Wrote:My answer is that the basic soldiering skill sets need to be trained in adolescence, in a long-term warrior development track that is decided early, not when you are 18-25yrs old.Who would make this decision? The child? How many American youths would choose this warrior path? In my entire life, I've only known one individual who knew as a child that he wanted to become a combat soldier, and was dedicated enough to train himself in applicable physical and mental skills before enlisting in the Army.
Quote:Only the private sector can really cover down on this in the US...The private sector operates on the basis of supply and demand. What evidence exists to think there are enough customers willing and able to pay for this type of training, so that a private company would supply it?
Considerations on the Evolution of War - JASmith - 04-14-2014
LRRPF, that is an excellent example!
I also knew a couple of folks who knew where they were going while still in high school. One of them became a SEAL.
As it happens, those headed for one of the service academies are almost required to make an initial decision before their sophomore year in high school. That's when the contacts have to start to get congressional appointments and the serious check-list work starts. The academies look for an awful lot of things, and there ARE check lists available to help guide the young folks in what they need to do.
The high-school level NROTC, AFROTC, and Army programs help with getting a good start for all ranks but, I agree, we in the US seem to look askance at the real or would-be warrior.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - LRRPF52 - 04-14-2014
stanc Wrote:Who would make this decision? The child? How many American youths would choose this warrior path? In my entire life, I've only known one individual who knew as a child that he wanted to become a combat soldier, and was dedicated enough to train himself in applicable physical and mental skills before enlisting in the Army.
I knew I was going to be in the military since I could walk, but there were limited options, and even fewer appropriate venues for learning any martial skills once I became a cadet when I was 13. Instead of learning anything of value toward martial skill sets, we were run ragged doing uniform inspections and drill & ceremonies.
As such, the first few weeks of Basic Training were an absolute waste of time for me, and quite boringly painful, aside from the constant smoke session I was subjected to, along with my platoon.
In every Infantry unit I was in, I would say at least 50% of the kids had military service in their sights since childhood, but it would be interesting to see a formal survey conducted across the combat arms. There certainly is a large presence of adventure seekers in Airborne and Light Infantry units, as well as those who have a sense of duty to the Nation, whether from family tradition, or a personal sense of obligation to their Country (patriotism). Very few were in it for the college money.
Quote:The private sector operates on the basis of supply and demand. What evidence exists to think there are enough customers willing and able to pay for this type of training, so that a private company would supply it?
The abject failure of public and many private schools to adequately address the educational needs of boys is all that is needed. I wonder where I would have to look to find any of that going on....
Considerations on the Evolution of War - LRRPF52 - 04-14-2014
JASmith Wrote:LRRPF, that is an excellent example!
I also knew a couple of folks who knew where they were going while still in high school. One of them became a SEAL.
As it happens, those headed for one of the service academies are almost required to make an initial decision before their sophomore year in high school. That's when the contacts have to start to get congressional appointments and the serious check-list work starts. The academies look for an awful lot of things, and there ARE check lists available to help guide the young folks in what they need to do.
The high-school level NROTC, AFROTC, and Army programs help with getting a good start for all ranks but, I agree, we in the US seem to look askance at the real or would-be warrior.
The ROTC programs are usually quite pathetic, unless you have a really exceptional leadership climate that knows what it takes to develop young leaders. The field problems are usually a joke, and the overall mentality of the ROTC students is anything but battle-focused, at least what I've seen of Army ROTC programs.
I am aware of some exceptions, and a very good friend of mine was extremely influential in making his college ROTC program a phenomenal one....as a student. The big difference with him is that he just finished 4 years of enlisted service as a Recon Marine with one of the two Force Reconnaissance Companies, and was assigned a senior leadership position within his unit. He went on to serve as an Infantry and Special Forces officer in the Army, and had an illustrious career, most of which can't be discussed, and never will be since he passed away in 2010.
The real measure of the effectiveness of good leaders in a student training environment manifests itself in those you have an ability to influence. In Tom's case, many of the kids who worked with him went on to become pillars in the Special Operations Community. It kinda has an impact on your program when a Recon Marine returns from SEA before people really even knew anything was going on there, and is able to spread the wealth of experience with aspiring young warriors.
If you can cut out desk jockeys and the mentally weak men who seek to hide in a uniform for 20 years so they can get a retirement, and maintain a staff who have internalized the warrior ethos, the program will be night and day. One will crank out nerds who learn a lot of really bad habits, then pass them on in the military.
The other will channel what's already inside a lot of people, hone it, coach it, mentor it, and develop it into its full potential.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-15-2014
LRRPF52 Wrote:I knew I was going to be in the military since I could walk...What you seem to be talking about is a modern version of what the ancient Spartans did. I think it sounds like an excellent way to "breed" warriors, but wouldn't such a school be beyond the financial means of most parents? That is, if you're talking about training the kids who would become enlisted personnel, not just the few sons of wealthy people who are aiming at a commission.
In every Infantry unit I was in, I would say at least 50% of the kids had military service in their sights since childhood, but it would be interesting to see a formal survey conducted across the combat arms. There certainly is a large presence of adventure seekers in Airborne and Light Infantry units, as well as those who have a sense of duty to the Nation, whether from family tradition, or a personal sense of obligation to their Country (patriotism).
The abject failure of public and many private schools to adequately address the educational needs of boys is all that is needed.
For example, I was interested in the military since about the age of 5, but my folks never had even a fraction of the funds necessary to send me to any kind of private school, let alone one such as you propose.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - cory - 04-15-2014
Let me just say first and for most, I'm really enjoy following this thread now. It has really taken an interesting, worthwhile direction.
I fully agree with you LRPF52, but I'm not sure it's possible to raise a warrior class with the wussification of America's youth that's going on. However, I'm completely open to ideas to move in the direction of a Warrior Class that begins at childhood.
One of the great things about the rising popularity of the UFC is the rise of MMA style martial arts dojos across the country. These could and should be utilized by kids who show an interest in the military as a career.
I don't think this will fix the problem, but it may be a step in the right direction. Let me throw this out there and see what you think. What if the Marines and Army offered a program that allowed a kid to complete bootcamp during the summer before their senior or junior year of highschool. Setup a program at the state's reserve station that would train them, mentor them, and monitor them to insure they are meeting certain academic requirements. Then after graduating highschool they could be sent to their MOS school. Of course this would likely require an ~8 year commitment. What say y'all?
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-15-2014
LRRPF52 Wrote:The ROTC programs are usually quite pathetic, unless you have a really exceptional leadership climate that knows what it takes to develop young leaders. The field problems are usually a joke, and the overall mentality of the ROTC students is anything but battle-focused, at least what I've seen of Army ROTC programs.That's true, but speaking as a former high school ROTC member, they are really rather limited in what they can do insofar as teaching war. My ROTC classes were only 55 minutes per day, 5 days a week. That's nowhere near enough time to conduct any kind of field exercises, and still get back in time for one's next class (math, chemistry, etc.). We did a lot of close order drill, but got only minimal weapons training and instruction on other military subjects like patrolling and map reading.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - stanc - 04-15-2014
cory Wrote:Let me throw this out there and see what you think. What if the Marines and Army offered a program that allowed a kid to complete bootcamp during the summer before their senior or junior year of highschool. Setup a program at the state's reserve station that would train them, mentor them, and monitor them to insure they are meeting certain academic requirements. Then after graduating highschool they could be sent to their MOS school. Of course this would likely require an ~8 year commitment. What say y'all?What would be the advantage of that over going to basic training after high school?
Considerations on the Evolution of War - JASmith - 04-15-2014
Michael Wrote:....4th Generation warfare. This is insurgency/guerrilla warfare that uses all elements to defeat a stronger force. The four generations of warfare are 1) the use of massed manpower (up to Napoleonic Wars), 2) firepower (up to WW I), 3) maneuver (WW II and focus of U.S. military strategy to date) , and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available power and networkspolitical, economic, social, militaryto convince an opponents decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly.
Have I overlooked the posts that describes the environments implied by "...insurgency/guerrilla warfare that uses all elements to defeat a stronger force"?
In particular, it would be good to see descriptions that help describe the social and political factors influencing the following factors:
- target ranges (including span of ranges and frequency of occurence)
- ability to identify targets
- consequences of collateral damage
- terminal performance needs
- accuracy needs
- etc.
Considerations on the Evolution of War - cory - 04-15-2014
stanc Wrote:What would be the advantage of that over going to basic training after high school?
I for one knew I was going into the Marines my sophomore year. Instead of preparing myself as a warrior I spent my in highschool focusing on having fun. My mind set was I had to do it then that I wouldn't have that luxury or liberty after I left for bootcamp. I played football in highschool which gave me some physical training. I wasn't concerned with pushing myself further as I was under the ignorant mindset that parish island would get me in the physical condition I needed to be in.
Even if I wasn't under that ignorant train of thought, I didn't have the knowledge to prepare myself physically and certainly not as a warrior.
Now let's touch on the fact that these 18 kids going to bootcamp are children still and a few months is not enough time to prepare them mentally.