06-16-2013, 06:30 PM
Short-n-sassy, let me translate that article from K-Streetease into a new language called gruntbeancounterease.
Translation: "We place these COP's not only surrounded by, but literally underneath the fields of fire of enterprising Mujaheddin-gone-Taliban (who received better light infantry and insurgency training than our own forces under the CIA during the Soviet-Afghan War), then start talking about the last line of defense, individual small arms, as a weak link in the system to tug at heartstrings in order to grease the wheels of one of our potentially lucrative programs being pushed by no less than 2 major foreign small arms manufacturers, and who knows how many US firms. By highlighting the perception of failure and isolating the discussion to the M4 in Wanat, we might dupe unsuspecting (and uncaring) members of the Armed Services Committees to make rain with taxpayer funds for the new carbine."
News flash: No small arm would have given them a decisive advantage in that battle, especially not one in a larger caliber with less capacity. Here's why: The Taliban conducted lengthy pre-operational surveillance of the stupidly insane positioning of the COP in question, and targeted the crew-served weapons first, before attempting to overrun the COP under covering fire from their crew-served and most casualty-producing weapons, which included mortars, heavy machineguns, RPG's, and PKM's. Additionally, they were attacking from the high ground. That the US unit was able to repel their attack with M4's should be a testament to the weapon's benefits, not failures. They also had SAW's that were running to failure point due to exceeding the design limitations of metallurgy, not arrangement. You can only hose away for so long until a weapon gives up at the weakest link in the system. AK's would have failed much earlier, simply because the handguards will catch fire, unlike the RAS.
Going back to training, whoever the brainiacs are that continue to place these COPs under the interlocking fields of fire of heavy weapons easily emplaced in dominant terrain need to be fired and punished for gross incompetence. Who here is willing to declare that if the soldiers at Wanat had 6.5 Grendels, that the 9 who died would have been saved?
They had received intel they were going to be hit. The locals turned on their irrigation system at 0200 to cover the advance of the Taliban, and the attack coincided with a shift-change of the unit providing CAS to these guys. They were literally surrounded by enemy forces who had the high ground, an excellent plan formed on detailed intel, and cooperation from the locals...and a different small arms caliber is going to make a difference?
This is why people with operational experience and discerning intellect need to be involved in these things, because it seems pretty easy to pull the wool over the eyes of many who are looking to "help" or profit in the company of the ignorant. We have a systemic problem where incompetence and tactical insanity are character traits that seem to be highly-prized, while savvy veterans with logical approaches are sidelined and marginalized. Small arms doesn't even rate worthy mention when talking about Wanat, but Court Martials and institutional leadership failures are at the top of the list.
Oh gee, look what I found:
[video=youtube;Srv99eZpJiA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Srv99eZpJiA[/video]
Quote:Tragically in July of 2008, at the Battle of Wanat, a small outpost of soldiers in Afghanistan were overrun by Taliban insurgents and suffered from failures of their M4 rifles. In November 2008, nineteen small arms manufacturers appeared at an 'Industry Day' in Virginia to showcase to the Army the advances made in small arms technology. Despite this need from the troops and the overwhelming interest of the small arms industry, the Army has said that it will be 2014, at the earliest, when our soldiers might get a new carbine rifle. . . . Unfortunately, there is no mechanism, process, or organization where the users of small arms can formally tell the Army of reliability, or other concerns about their weapons. . . .
Translation: "We place these COP's not only surrounded by, but literally underneath the fields of fire of enterprising Mujaheddin-gone-Taliban (who received better light infantry and insurgency training than our own forces under the CIA during the Soviet-Afghan War), then start talking about the last line of defense, individual small arms, as a weak link in the system to tug at heartstrings in order to grease the wheels of one of our potentially lucrative programs being pushed by no less than 2 major foreign small arms manufacturers, and who knows how many US firms. By highlighting the perception of failure and isolating the discussion to the M4 in Wanat, we might dupe unsuspecting (and uncaring) members of the Armed Services Committees to make rain with taxpayer funds for the new carbine."
News flash: No small arm would have given them a decisive advantage in that battle, especially not one in a larger caliber with less capacity. Here's why: The Taliban conducted lengthy pre-operational surveillance of the stupidly insane positioning of the COP in question, and targeted the crew-served weapons first, before attempting to overrun the COP under covering fire from their crew-served and most casualty-producing weapons, which included mortars, heavy machineguns, RPG's, and PKM's. Additionally, they were attacking from the high ground. That the US unit was able to repel their attack with M4's should be a testament to the weapon's benefits, not failures. They also had SAW's that were running to failure point due to exceeding the design limitations of metallurgy, not arrangement. You can only hose away for so long until a weapon gives up at the weakest link in the system. AK's would have failed much earlier, simply because the handguards will catch fire, unlike the RAS.
Going back to training, whoever the brainiacs are that continue to place these COPs under the interlocking fields of fire of heavy weapons easily emplaced in dominant terrain need to be fired and punished for gross incompetence. Who here is willing to declare that if the soldiers at Wanat had 6.5 Grendels, that the 9 who died would have been saved?
They had received intel they were going to be hit. The locals turned on their irrigation system at 0200 to cover the advance of the Taliban, and the attack coincided with a shift-change of the unit providing CAS to these guys. They were literally surrounded by enemy forces who had the high ground, an excellent plan formed on detailed intel, and cooperation from the locals...and a different small arms caliber is going to make a difference?
This is why people with operational experience and discerning intellect need to be involved in these things, because it seems pretty easy to pull the wool over the eyes of many who are looking to "help" or profit in the company of the ignorant. We have a systemic problem where incompetence and tactical insanity are character traits that seem to be highly-prized, while savvy veterans with logical approaches are sidelined and marginalized. Small arms doesn't even rate worthy mention when talking about Wanat, but Court Martials and institutional leadership failures are at the top of the list.
Oh gee, look what I found:
[video=youtube;Srv99eZpJiA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Srv99eZpJiA[/video]