Considerations on the Evolution of War

[LRRPF52]

At the other end, is the 4th Generation war, where collateral damage by our weapons is viewed as a win by the adversaries. Individual weapons would likely become dominant because they can be very precise and have rather limited collateral effects. Here, we might see a greater need for longer range in those small-arms while still having the ability to call on assets from the larger organization when things go into that brown place.

I hope this would explain why my first lecture request is to paint a picture of what the battalion as a fire-system looks like in the full scale war. What assumptions can we make about:

1. Organic sensors and surveillance for directing maneuver and fire?
   
2. What heavy weapons are available and how close to troops will they be used.
   
3. Finally, what individual weapons are available, and when would they be used?
   

Later, we can morph this picture into what it should look like in a 4th Generation conflict along with a discussion of how logistical tails might need to be re-defined to assure availability of appropriate weapons and ammunition.

DM's and Snipers
This is one of the reasons why Designated Marksmen and Snipers are so critical to the successful outcome of collateral damage aversive ROE, and they have been proven in gray area conflict zones. You will typically see foreign insurgents and their surrogates rallying locals, and causing general unrest and agitation via bullhorns and being the loud one, or providing critical forward observer and battlefield scouting to insurgents with crew-served weapons directed against your forces.

With the right leadership climate, given the green light to dirt nap those individuals surgically has proven to be very effective at shutting down agitators and scouts.

It's both a training and an equipment/weapons issue, which when combined are a key part of that formula for success in LIC. As soon as snipers start zapping these targets, they learn the effective range of your weapons quickly, and move just outside of that envelope, which is why it's nice for Scout Sniper Platoons to have an assortment of rifles with the range capabilities to escalate the terminal effective range as the situation unfolds.

The Brits in Basra is an excellent example of what I'm talking about. They were static on top of their compound, and having to repel insurgent attacks without jeopardizing the rest of the city's inhabitants. They made effective kills out to 962m with the L96A1 7.62 NATO Precision Rifle (Accuracy International), so the mortar spotters (insurgent FO's) located themselves beyond 1000m, out to 1500 and 2000m. An SBS Sniper stopped by their compound with his Barrett .50 BMG, with Mk. 211 Mod 0 Roufoss HE Multi-purpose ammunition, and things changed a bit.



They had the mortar crews located behind buildings so the Brits couldn't see them, but their compound was well within mortar range. The spotters would step to the side of the building within LOS, and using optics and cell phones, would provide coordinates and corrections for the mortars to be accurate. After displacing outside of 7.62 NATO range, they felt immune to the British Sniper fire, until the .50 showed up. The SBS trooper left the weapon with a bag of Mk. 211 on the roof for the boys, and told them not to shoot it all up while he went down below for some much needed rest.

When he woke up and went topside, lots of spotters had met Allah, and the Mk.211 ammo was totally expended. These events and others pushed the UK to sh*tcan the 7.62 L96A1 PM, and adopt a totally new long-range sniper system chambered in..... .338 Lapua Magnum, designated the L115A3:



You've probably heard about some of the accomplishments achieved with it over the years.

What's important to take notice of in terms of force structure and the weapons allocation in the MTO&E, is that the Brits kept 7.62 NATO, and actually increased its presence in infantry units via the Designated Marksman Rifle in the form of the US-Made LMT Modular Weapon System.

That combined with the .338 LM L115A3 covers a lot of ground with surgical shooters. They also have a very attentive, active DM and Sniper training program to accompany the presence of the weapons.

On the US side in the Army, we have seen similar measures, but the AMU seems to be the only ones running with the ball for the DM program. Sniper Training is still handled rather poorly at Fort Benning, whereas the Marines have Division-level courses that are held to the same standards as their course in Quantico.

The weapon and ammunition solution for DM's has been a mixture of ad hoc solutions in the Army, whereas SOCOM has the best platforms and ammunition, and should be modeled to an extent in big Army. Every Infantry Rifle Platoon needs 2 DM's per Squad (6 DM duty positions ), with the key leaders being SME's in all the skill sets under them, including DM, so a real total of 16 formally-trained DM's.

That means unit-level DM Courses and a Training Detachment at the Division or Brigade level, depending on how drastically we down-size.

The next issue is the weapons themselves that the DM will be issued. With a minimal amount of funds, existing M4 carbines can be converted into DM Carbines with a better barrel, and the SOPMOD Block II free float handguard. ACOGs are already in the system, although a more ideal DMC optic needs to be looked at in the long-term.

Next is ammunition. The Mk. 262 77gr is an excellent load for accuracy, but does have some barrier-defeat limitations, even when compared to M855.