08-27-2011, 06:30 PM
IIRC, the B-1A design criteria called for a certain airspeed/altitude/time relationship, and, though I may be off a bit, it was something like the following: 200 feet above ground level (AGL) for 1500 miles at Mach 1.2. Long before the B-1A cancellation, these criteria had been dropped, primarily due to engine inlet geometry costs, so there was no supersonic capability until the B-1B, though I think that made little practical difference against a high-subsonic aircraft penetrator. Soviet interceptor aircraft had several limitations; one was related to fuel fraction and the other air-to-air acquisition radar capability. Virtually their entire air force was limited to ground control vectors of the type such as "Turn now to a heading of 216 and increase airspeed to (something in KM/Hr)." If the controller figured it wrong, or the pilot increased at the wrong rate, or didn't pick up the target, most of the USSR's interceptors would run dry of fuel and have to bingo return to base. From practical experience I can say that an interceptor would have to be nearly perfect to intercept a 600-knot, low level aircraft, even without Mach capability (though it's nice to have it when you need it).
We've noted the tendency to adopt an adversary's systems; after southeast Asia, the US is moving bigger than 5.56, the USSR moved to their own small, high-speed bullet. The same effect took place in the air. Our experience in the air over southeast Asia led us to buy a small, highly maneuverable F-16/F-18 capability, while getting rid of the large, fast, and smokey-engined F-4. Is it a surprise that the Soviets changed their approach, too? The MiG 23/27 is a large, smokey-engined, multi-role fighter, with speed and legs, and I wouldn't be surprised to find better acquisition capability, but I don't know about that. The MiG-25 was designed to target the non-built B-70, but would have worked also against a high-speed, high-altitude B-1 penetration, while the MiG and the Sukhoi-27 would be assigned the penetrators. Speaking as a penetrator (in my B-52 role), I was delighted to have Short Range Attack Missiles and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, both for mission capability and for cluttering up radar returns.
I don't know about the real world aspects of the Phoenix, but the Soviets had to honor its range and spend time watching for high angle contrails. Missiles themselves weren't too hard to defeat - think of them as very highly wing-loaded fighters. A small turn at high Mach speed meant 20 - 40 G's on an AA missile, and that would bleed speed quickly. F-4s routinely (though with great puckering) dodged thousands of ground to air missiles over southeast Asia, a much more dense electronic environment than existed elsewhere.
Still, on the point of requirements, our shift to cruise missiles made the entire industrial effort put into interceptors essentially wasted, as, in general, they make poor, and expensive, air to ground platforms. We could afford the change, while our adversaries could not.
I'd have to say that most - or even, "virtually all," of the contract competitions are real and honest, and the one's that aren't are extremely difficult to identify. Companies pay six-figure salaries to sales staff to help determine which direction a contract competition is leaning, and if they aren't going to win, why would they continue to spend millions of dollars to compete? Where the finangling happens is in the wording of the RFP, and some of that takes place as system requirements above the contracting officer level. I saw one once in which a small item was required to be black, when the color didn't matter at all and only one contractor used that color; I called the project staff on it (I was the contracting officer in that scene), and they changed the wording. Sometimes it's just laziness, rather than conspiracy; the larger system is made up of smaller systems that were developed from R&D, and some of those smaller contracts may well have been guided, yes, to the only possible contractor, and that rationale doesn't exist at the higher component level.
So, we're back to requirements again. Some, such as the choice of the 7.62x51 in the early Fifties was just bone-headed; the authorities just "knew" the more powerful round was better. Today, the authorities might not be concerned about the cost of replacing the 5.56, but instead be learning from the example of introducing the 5.56 during wartime - it cost some lives. Can we imagine CNN showing bodies attributable to new rifle/cartridge malfunctions? Chair-borne fear is different than operational fear, but it's a real motivator, nonetheless.
Now, with lecture mode off, I have a question suggested Tony's web site. We recognize the retained energy beyond 500 meters is advantage: Grendel, compared to the 7.632x51, but what about inside 500 meters? Is there a power requirement inside 500 meters that would disadvantage the Grendel in favor of the more powerful M80 ball? I'm thinking about chewing up cinder block, or something the M80 could do better...
We've noted the tendency to adopt an adversary's systems; after southeast Asia, the US is moving bigger than 5.56, the USSR moved to their own small, high-speed bullet. The same effect took place in the air. Our experience in the air over southeast Asia led us to buy a small, highly maneuverable F-16/F-18 capability, while getting rid of the large, fast, and smokey-engined F-4. Is it a surprise that the Soviets changed their approach, too? The MiG 23/27 is a large, smokey-engined, multi-role fighter, with speed and legs, and I wouldn't be surprised to find better acquisition capability, but I don't know about that. The MiG-25 was designed to target the non-built B-70, but would have worked also against a high-speed, high-altitude B-1 penetration, while the MiG and the Sukhoi-27 would be assigned the penetrators. Speaking as a penetrator (in my B-52 role), I was delighted to have Short Range Attack Missiles and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, both for mission capability and for cluttering up radar returns.
I don't know about the real world aspects of the Phoenix, but the Soviets had to honor its range and spend time watching for high angle contrails. Missiles themselves weren't too hard to defeat - think of them as very highly wing-loaded fighters. A small turn at high Mach speed meant 20 - 40 G's on an AA missile, and that would bleed speed quickly. F-4s routinely (though with great puckering) dodged thousands of ground to air missiles over southeast Asia, a much more dense electronic environment than existed elsewhere.
Still, on the point of requirements, our shift to cruise missiles made the entire industrial effort put into interceptors essentially wasted, as, in general, they make poor, and expensive, air to ground platforms. We could afford the change, while our adversaries could not.
I'd have to say that most - or even, "virtually all," of the contract competitions are real and honest, and the one's that aren't are extremely difficult to identify. Companies pay six-figure salaries to sales staff to help determine which direction a contract competition is leaning, and if they aren't going to win, why would they continue to spend millions of dollars to compete? Where the finangling happens is in the wording of the RFP, and some of that takes place as system requirements above the contracting officer level. I saw one once in which a small item was required to be black, when the color didn't matter at all and only one contractor used that color; I called the project staff on it (I was the contracting officer in that scene), and they changed the wording. Sometimes it's just laziness, rather than conspiracy; the larger system is made up of smaller systems that were developed from R&D, and some of those smaller contracts may well have been guided, yes, to the only possible contractor, and that rationale doesn't exist at the higher component level.
So, we're back to requirements again. Some, such as the choice of the 7.62x51 in the early Fifties was just bone-headed; the authorities just "knew" the more powerful round was better. Today, the authorities might not be concerned about the cost of replacing the 5.56, but instead be learning from the example of introducing the 5.56 during wartime - it cost some lives. Can we imagine CNN showing bodies attributable to new rifle/cartridge malfunctions? Chair-borne fear is different than operational fear, but it's a real motivator, nonetheless.
Now, with lecture mode off, I have a question suggested Tony's web site. We recognize the retained energy beyond 500 meters is advantage: Grendel, compared to the 7.632x51, but what about inside 500 meters? Is there a power requirement inside 500 meters that would disadvantage the Grendel in favor of the more powerful M80 ball? I'm thinking about chewing up cinder block, or something the M80 could do better...