Considerations on the Evolution of War

[Michael]

I have been asked by a forum member to start a new threat to post some information from another thread for folks to consider and make it a little easier to find. In the past couple of years I have seen a lot of great, well thought out posts about the direction military weapons should go, but in a lot of cases I am not sure as to the posters appreciation on where warfare is heading. Please don’t take this last statement the wrong way. I am not an expert, just a fairly dedicated student of the art of war.

First, the below link is to an article that talks about 4th Generation warfare. This is insurgency/guerrilla warfare that uses all elements to defeat a stronger force. The four generations of warfare are 1) the use of massed manpower (up to Napoleonic Wars), 2) firepower (up to WW I), 3) maneuver (WW II and focus of U.S. military strategy to date) , and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available power and networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an opponent’s decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly.

I encourage you to read the link, and if it interest you, the author has a book titled ‘The Sling and the Stone’, and Max Boot’s ‘War made New’ is another good read on the evolution of war.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/sf214.pdf

[Michael]

Below is copied from the thread mentioned in post 1 above.

We in the military have historically tended to focus on the last war when designing our systems ant tactics. There have been some who looked ahead- or at the current situation- and went against the grain in their conduct of warfare (LGen ‘Brute’ Krulak and how Marines fought in I Corps in the mid-60s comes to mind, as does J-SOC forces in ‘01-‘02). We also have a tendency to focus on the enemies’, or perceived enemies’ Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) as opposed to the enemies’ Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). There is a growing group within the military and government that see the fallacy of fighting the last war – or preparing for the MDCOA at the expense of preparing for the MLCOA.

One of the classes I have taught over the last several years has been ‘Evolution of Warfare’. In that class we look at how warfare has evolved over the last 2000 years and where it is heading. I spent a lot of time doing research, reading and applying my own hard earned lessons learned in the process of educating the future officers. Based on a lot of reading, I have come to the following hypothesizes;

1) Full scale war – conventional or non-conventional - with an equal or near equal state competitor is unlikely. Global diplomacy, economies and information systems (three of the four areas of national power, the fourth being military) are too interconnected and interdependent. Again, it is unlikely, not impossible. I see this as the MDCOA. We still must be prepared for 3d generation warfare.
2) As of right now, no other nation state has the ability to project force to the extent of the U.S. . There are those who are trying, but it is not their focus of effort, and it is highly unlikely anyone will reach the potential to forward deploy a force of any size for at least 30 years. IE Invasion U.S.A. from a state actor doesn’t keep me up at night.
3) Unilateral action by a single nation state against a weaker state or non-state actor would have dramatic economic, diplomatic and military repercussions from the rest of the world. This is evident by current backlash against Russia.
4) Urban sprawl and discontent/poverty/class separation within the littoral regions of 3rd and 4th world nations (and it is encroaching into the traditional 1st world) will continue to impact global security, trade, travel and information sharing to the point a state actor – or group of state actors - will be forced to become involved (see the Arab Spring). As mentioned in point 2) we’re it when it comes to being able to project force, so it will most likely be a U.S. led/sponsored force.
5) Since the point of friction is the urban 3rd/4th world terrain, that is where we will most likely close with and fight the enemy. This terrain will be dominated by restricted maneuver and movement, and the enemy will most likely be non-state actors (may be funded/supported by agitator states) who hides among people who are neutral or non-participants. In order to maintain coalition and worldwide support, the state actors must be very judicious in the application of military power IOT avoid collateral damage, or turning a neutral party/person into an enemy by killing their family. This last scenario is, in the opinions of a lot of smart folks, the MLCOA for the future of our military operations and is considered 4th generation warfare.

So what does this mean? When you are talking MDCOA/3rd generation warfare, you are talking planes and missiles, with the possibility of large armored forces. When you are talking the MLCOA/4th generation warfare, you are talking about smaller lighter units on the ground – Reg/BN sized infantry units, SOF, maybe even some light armor.

In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.

[LRRPF52]

I'm aware of the concept of 4th Generation Warfare. I'm also aware of several conflicts throughout history that have had elements of Gen I, Gen II, Gen III, and Gen IV.

Practically every conflict has these elements in it:

* Initiations of hostility planned at the diplomatic level by allies, or soon-to-be allies
* Initiations of hostility planned by revolutionary factions, often acting as surrogates for a foreign power seeking to destabilize a region (Black FLag, Bolsheviks, Al Qaeda...)
* The intelligence aspect of war before outbreak of hostilities
* The combination of conventional forces on front lines of skirmish with each other, while men of finance, spies, mercenaries, and indigenous fighters make more decisive actions affecting the overall campaign in the periphery and shadows.

We could be talking about ancient Han civilization, the French-Indian Wars, The Great War, Vietnam, or OIF1.

All conflict seems to involve aspects of all of these dimensions, although we have seen a lot more hot spots where there isn't a presence of a large conventional force to oppose one that chooses to enter it.

We have also seen the spaces of earth orbit and the cybersphere brought into the realm of conflict. Many would add that information warfare is a new battlefield, but history is filled with examples to the contrary. Technology has simply increased the access to and distribution of information warfare products and campaigns.

[Michael]

LRRPF52 - You are correct about many conflicts having elements of massed forces, fires, maneuver and insurgency, but in my mind the political aspect combined with the readily available communications devices/systems/networks have made the insurgents activities influence the will of the policy makers directly. I think this is what really sets 4th generation warfare apart from traditional insurgencies of the past. As the technology becomes more available and more capable, you will see this aspect combined with historic insurgent tactics as the primary technique for enemies of powerful nation states.

[JASmith]

Thanks for starting this discussion!

My sense is that the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong leaned heavily on 4th Generation concepts even though they are arguably not the first.

For example, Napoleon burned up much of his strength trying to suppress insurgents in Spain. Hence the term "Guerilla."

The major difference is that US has been blessed with a period of freedom from threats of Full Scale war and dominates the Force Projection game. This has given space for those who I think have been the most clear-head thinkers: those who think about Rupert Smith's "War Among the People." This is a good move, because the major deterrence advocates almost uniformly forget or ignore the very real fact that a major part of the deterrence equation is a nation's effectiveness in small and mid-sized engagements. That makes the large-scale deterrence far more credible.

[JASmith]

We can forecast that this thread will take some interesting turns long before it gets too long for someone new to the forum to comfortably read through!

Here is the first turn: What infantry weapons make the most sense in each of the levels of conflict Michael posited?

[Michael]

JASmith - Are you talking individual weapons, or are you looking at the full compliment of weapons within a battalion?

[JASmith]

Forgive me, please, if I sound a bit smart-assed, but folks in this forum tend to want to get to the individual weapon. This means the carbine (hopefully 6.5 Grendel), and then, grudgingly, talk about machine guns. Everything else tends to be in a very fuzzy background. This is in spite of the fact that the carbine is today only a small part of the overall firepower equation.

While the discussion will quickly narrow to the individual weapon, my own and, I suspect yours too, experience suggests that the battalion is a good size to start when considering Full-Scale war as long as aviation and fixed wing air assets are considered. Individual weapons would be treated in the context of how they fill in gaps in the coverage given by other assets. Gap-filling is, I think, the role filled by the M4 and AK-series carbines because long-range antipersonnel and materiel interdiction would be accomplished by heavier assets in full-scale engagements.

At the other end, is the 4th Generation war, where collateral damage by our weapons is viewed as a win by the adversaries. Individual weapons would likely become dominant because they can be very precise and have rather limited collateral effects. Here, we might see a greater need for longer range in those small-arms while still having the ability to call on assets from the larger organization when things go into that brown place.

I hope this would explain why my first lecture request is to paint a picture of what the battalion as a fire-system looks like in the full scale war. What assumptions can we make about:

1. Organic sensors and surveillance for directing maneuver and fire?
   
2. What heavy weapons are available and how close to troops will they be used.
   
3. Finally, what individual weapons are available, and when would they be used?
   

Later, we can morph this picture into what it should look like in a 4th Generation conflict along with a discussion of how logistical tails might need to be re-defined to assure availability of appropriate weapons and ammunition.

[stanc]

Forgive me, please, if I sound a bit smart-assed, but folks in this forum tend to want to get to the individual weapon.

That's undoubtedly because this is a guns and ammo forum, not a strategy and logistics forum.

Individual weapons and machine guns will, of necessity, be the same for both full-scale war and counterinsurgency operations.

[JASmith]

...Individual weapons and machine guns will, of necessity, be the same for both full-scale war and counterinsurgency operations.

I would accept that statement if it came from someone with authoritative knowledge on the topic or references given that support the assertion.

[NugginFutz]

I wish you two would just agree to disagree.

[Michael]

I'll give answering JASmith's question...OK...let’s look at capabilities/specs we want at weapons in the squad. I am keeping these in a capabilities mindset – and in some cases very vague - as not to influence caliber or type of weapon. Some of the specs I have below may not even be possible with current tech…but you asked!

All three weapons must -
Meet or exceeded current MilSpec durability/longevity standards (don’t know what these are)
Be chambered for the same caliber
Use a common magazine that holds a minimum of 25rds, weighs no more than 1lb, and is within +/-3% of the size of current STANAG magazines.
Be compatible with current Mil issue optics/accessories.

Ammo and projectiles must-
Be green/lead free
Meet current MilSpec weatherproof standards

Carbine/individual weapon
Auto loading capable of Select fire, semi/full auto
Wt – No more than 7 lbs loaded
Lng – No longer than 32”
Able to defeat Level III armor at 200m
2.5 MOA accuracy to 500m
KE over 450Ftlbs @ 500m

Squad automatic weapon
Wt – no more than 9 lbs unloadeded
Lngth – no longer than 38”
Able to defeat Level III armor at 300m
Rate of Fire – max within 500-800RPM
Max effective range – 800m point target
- 1000m area target

DM rifle
Auto loading capable of Select fire, semi/full auto
Wt – No more than 8.5 lbs loaded
Lng – No longer than 38”
Able to defeat Level III armor at 300m
1.5 MOA accuracy to 700m
KE over 450Ftlbs @ 600m

I may have forgotten a few things. Think I posted something similar a few months ago somewhere. Feel free to rip apart or add to.

[LRRPF52]

At the other end, is the 4th Generation war, where collateral damage by our weapons is viewed as a win by the adversaries. Individual weapons would likely become dominant because they can be very precise and have rather limited collateral effects. Here, we might see a greater need for longer range in those small-arms while still having the ability to call on assets from the larger organization when things go into that brown place.

I hope this would explain why my first lecture request is to paint a picture of what the battalion as a fire-system looks like in the full scale war. What assumptions can we make about:

1. Organic sensors and surveillance for directing maneuver and fire?
   
2. What heavy weapons are available and how close to troops will they be used.
   
3. Finally, what individual weapons are available, and when would they be used?
   

Later, we can morph this picture into what it should look like in a 4th Generation conflict along with a discussion of how logistical tails might need to be re-defined to assure availability of appropriate weapons and ammunition.

DM's and Snipers
This is one of the reasons why Designated Marksmen and Snipers are so critical to the successful outcome of collateral damage aversive ROE, and they have been proven in gray area conflict zones. You will typically see foreign insurgents and their surrogates rallying locals, and causing general unrest and agitation via bullhorns and being the loud one, or providing critical forward observer and battlefield scouting to insurgents with crew-served weapons directed against your forces.

With the right leadership climate, given the green light to dirt nap those individuals surgically has proven to be very effective at shutting down agitators and scouts.

It's both a training and an equipment/weapons issue, which when combined are a key part of that formula for success in LIC. As soon as snipers start zapping these targets, they learn the effective range of your weapons quickly, and move just outside of that envelope, which is why it's nice for Scout Sniper Platoons to have an assortment of rifles with the range capabilities to escalate the terminal effective range as the situation unfolds.

The Brits in Basra is an excellent example of what I'm talking about. They were static on top of their compound, and having to repel insurgent attacks without jeopardizing the rest of the city's inhabitants. They made effective kills out to 962m with the L96A1 7.62 NATO Precision Rifle (Accuracy International), so the mortar spotters (insurgent FO's) located themselves beyond 1000m, out to 1500 and 2000m. An SBS Sniper stopped by their compound with his Barrett .50 BMG, with Mk. 211 Mod 0 Roufoss HE Multi-purpose ammunition, and things changed a bit.



They had the mortar crews located behind buildings so the Brits couldn't see them, but their compound was well within mortar range. The spotters would step to the side of the building within LOS, and using optics and cell phones, would provide coordinates and corrections for the mortars to be accurate. After displacing outside of 7.62 NATO range, they felt immune to the British Sniper fire, until the .50 showed up. The SBS trooper left the weapon with a bag of Mk. 211 on the roof for the boys, and told them not to shoot it all up while he went down below for some much needed rest.

When he woke up and went topside, lots of spotters had met Allah, and the Mk.211 ammo was totally expended. These events and others pushed the UK to sh*tcan the 7.62 L96A1 PM, and adopt a totally new long-range sniper system chambered in..... .338 Lapua Magnum, designated the L115A3:



You've probably heard about some of the accomplishments achieved with it over the years.

What's important to take notice of in terms of force structure and the weapons allocation in the MTO&E, is that the Brits kept 7.62 NATO, and actually increased its presence in infantry units via the Designated Marksman Rifle in the form of the US-Made LMT Modular Weapon System.

That combined with the .338 LM L115A3 covers a lot of ground with surgical shooters. They also have a very attentive, active DM and Sniper training program to accompany the presence of the weapons.

On the US side in the Army, we have seen similar measures, but the AMU seems to be the only ones running with the ball for the DM program. Sniper Training is still handled rather poorly at Fort Benning, whereas the Marines have Division-level courses that are held to the same standards as their course in Quantico.

The weapon and ammunition solution for DM's has been a mixture of ad hoc solutions in the Army, whereas SOCOM has the best platforms and ammunition, and should be modeled to an extent in big Army. Every Infantry Rifle Platoon needs 2 DM's per Squad (6 DM duty positions ), with the key leaders being SME's in all the skill sets under them, including DM, so a real total of 16 formally-trained DM's.

That means unit-level DM Courses and a Training Detachment at the Division or Brigade level, depending on how drastically we down-size.

The next issue is the weapons themselves that the DM will be issued. With a minimal amount of funds, existing M4 carbines can be converted into DM Carbines with a better barrel, and the SOPMOD Block II free float handguard. ACOGs are already in the system, although a more ideal DMC optic needs to be looked at in the long-term.

Next is ammunition. The Mk. 262 77gr is an excellent load for accuracy, but does have some barrier-defeat limitations, even when compared to M855.

[stanc]

I would accept that statement if it came from someone with authoritative knowledge on the topic or references given that support the assertion.

Don't take my word for it. Just look at the weapons being used in Afghanistan. None of the infantry rifles and machine guns used there were created and adopted exclusively for COIN operations. Same goes for the artillery, mortars, ATGMs, attack helicopters, fighter bombers, etc, etc.

[stanc]

With a minimal amount of funds, existing M4 carbines can be converted into DM Carbines with a better barrel, and the SOPMOD Block II free float handguard. ACOGs are already in the system, although a more ideal DMC optic needs to be looked at in the long-term.

Next is ammunition. The Mk. 262 77gr is an excellent load for accuracy, but does have some barrier-defeat limitations, even when compared to M855.

Other than AK mags in chest pouches, what barrier(s) would be of likely concern to a DM?

[video=youtube;dv03T0WBx0U]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv03T0WBx0U[/video]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv03T0WBx0U

[stanc]

All three weapons must -

Use a common magazine that holds a minimum of 25rds, weighs no more than 1lb, and is within +/-3% of the size of current STANAG magazines.

Use a common magazine that holds a minimum of 25rds - Since the standard magazine capacity for the last few decades has been 30 rounds, I can't see the military going to less. I'd suggest 30-rd minimum.

Weighs no more than 1lb - That should be no problem. IIRC, the steel 30-rd FAL mag weighs about 0.75 lb. A polymer 30-rd 7.62 NATO mag would weigh about half that.

Within +/-3% of the size of current STANAG magazines - Not possible with 30-rd mags for any cartridge with case diameter significantly larger than that of 5.56 NATO. For example, 30-rd 6.8 mags are about an inch taller than 30-rd 5.56 mags. (Also not possible with mags for any cartridge with OAL significantly longer than that of 5.56 NATO.)

[Michael]

[/COLOR]

Use a common magazine that holds a minimum of 25rds - Since the standard magazine capacity for the last few decades has been 30 rounds, I can't see the military going to less. I'd suggest 30-rd minimum.

[COLOR="red"]Maybe, maybe not. Depends on the other parameters being met.
[/COLOR]
Weighs no more than 1lb - That should be no problem. IIRC, the steel 30-rd FAL mag weighs about 0.75 lb. A polymer 30-rd 7.62 NATO mag would weigh about half that.

[COLOR="red"]Sorry...LOADED magazine.
[/COLOR]
Within +/-3% of the size of current STANAG magazines - Not possible with 30-rd mags for any cartridge with case diameter significantly larger than that of 5.56 NATO. For example, 30-rd 6.8 mags are about an inch taller than 30-rd 5.56 mags.

Yep. All of these were done intentionally. Just as with the weight requirement, there will be 2nd and 3rd order effects from an equipping, logistical and training aspect.

[stanc]

Weighs no more than 1lb - That should be no problem. IIRC, the steel 30-rd FAL mag weighs about 0.75 lb. A polymer 30-rd 7.62 NATO mag would weigh about half that.

Sorry...LOADED magazine.

Oh. In that case, I revise my statement: It will be a problem.

[JASmith]

Michael, Thanks for the concise draft summary of specs!

LRRPF52, Thanks for the additional insight for the need for long range precision assets in a scenario closer to a Gen 4 engagement than full-scale war.

How would the recommended individual weapon mix and capabilities change for Gen 4 engagements? In this, I concur with LRRPF52 in some of his other posts that we need to view the friendly forces as operating more in a Spec Ops than Line mode. One of the major differences is the individual and small unit to draw weapons and ammunition tailored to their expected needs.

[LRRPF52]

LIC Force Structure Considerations
Units that are part of Combined Task Forces that are assigned the responsibilities of maintaining stability and order, while ferreting out the non-uniformed combatants, need the flexibility to Tailor the Force, which was a specific aspect of Army doctrine at one time. I would have to brush up on what direction they have gone with the doctrinal publications, but the reality is there isn't a one-size fits all solution to a lot of these problems, from a screening and initial entry process, MOS & leadership training, or weapons and equipment viewpoints.

For most of your soldiers, 5.56 NATO is going to be more than adequate for their specific duty positions, whether they are trekking the mountains of Central Asia, or chasing down hood rats in North Africa. Once you start looking at the DM's and Company or Battalion Snipers, requirements shift a bit, with accuracy, wind drift and terminal effects at distance being higher prioritizations than the general issue carbines.

DM Carbines
DM's may want a choice between two different caliber platforms, depending on METT-TC. Under the current calibers, they should have that option between an accurate, lightweight 7.62 NATO SASS carbine, or an even lighter 5.56 accurized carbine, with appropriate optics and match ammunition for each. That's a significant logistics burden to place on combat arms units in conventional units, while it is standard in most special operations units.

Snipers
Same with Company and Battalion Snipers. If I'm supporting the line in a more overt posture in a mobility role, I want 7.62 NATO semi-auto (given the current logistics structure). If I'm doing a stay-behind operation and the AOR has distances that frequently require 800-2000m, I'm going to have at least long gun chambered in .338 LM if I can, with support from a 7.62 SASS, as well as an M4A2 with Grenade Launcher, and more M4A2's.

It would be nice to be able to have the Grendel instead of the 7.62 SASS weapons, and even the M4/SPR/DMC type carbines, as we could have less calibers to contend with, while balancing out the combat endurance of smaller teams that might break off in autonomous roles. 9 mags of 6.5 Grendel per Scout/Sniper in a 3-6 man team plus the .338 LM long gun and 40mm grenades would be better than 7 mags of 7.62 with 2 guys, and 9 mags of 5.56 with the others, because we could cross load with a match-grade cartridge that is excellent at reaching out, while perfectly suitable for shooting people in the face when clearing in a CQB or chance contact scenario.

Perspective
We're talking about a very marginal number of weapons in the whole task force when focused on snipers, so it's hard to sell the idea to long-term planners and logisticians, and for very valid reasons. The only thing that really makes sense is phasing out 7.62 NATO, as long as we do it with our European NATO partners over a long-term plan, but 7.62 NATO is very entrenched when it comes to vehicle-mounted belt-feds, and works fairly well for its role. We could have had something marginally better with less weight, but that didn't happen, thanks to the .30 cal nazi's and Dr. Carten.

There is a great argument for the 6.5 Grendel when talking about sniper teams (which have gone drastically away from 2 or 3-man teams), and I have several buddies who were left out to dry with their guys in OIF in totally different years and AORs, where they literally had to fight for their lives in the face of significantly superior numbers who wanted to kill them badly. 7.62 NATO and its limitations on individual soldier load and his ability to sustain a fight can play a huge role in that, especially when you have a mix of 7.62 NATO and 5.56 NATO within a small element that has valid reasons for carrying both systems.

2-Caliber System for Snipers?
A 6.5 Grendel + .338 LM weapon mix would be a heaven-send for snipers, but they are still largely dependent on a massive log chain that dumps pallets of 5.56 and 7.62 into AORs, often not including Mk.262 or 7.62 Long Range, no matter how much you request it through your XO and supply guys. That leaves you with M855 and M80 ball, .50 BMG, and a mission to accomplish. The Grendel could very much provide a 2-caliber solution that is currently covered by 4 calibers for snipers, but is the rest of the force going to change because of that? Nope, which is why I talk so much about the 6.5 LMG.

Here are the current US Army Calibers being used by snipers:

* 5.56 NATO
* 7.62 NATO
* .300 Winchester Magnum
* .50 BMG