Third Generation Battle Rifle

[LRRPF52]

Good eval. I agree with most everything that is said, but worthy (usually=costly) optics are not trashed by the SCAR-H. I can speak to that personally.

It seems that NightForce will hold up on the SCAR, but I've also seen 2nd-hand but reliable source claims that the SOPMOD accessories, to include the IR pointers and NODs/TWS might also be suffering from the different characteristics of the SCAR's recoil impulse and return-stroke. I have heard it from several people within SOCOM who have used the SCAR, conducted torture-tests with the SCAR-L, and shot a lot with the SCAR-H.

I'm also hearing it (M855A1) shortens barrel life by over half ,the accuracy sucks, it's over pressured, and is very expensive.

The bad accuracy seemed to be documented from the start, which was then advertised as better accuracy. A longer projectile shank with a harder material than standard cup and core projectiles seems like a basic recipe in physics to reduce barrel life, especially when run at the pressures they're running. The nature of the projectile demands that it cost significantly more than conventional projectiles. The standard M855 is more expensive to make as it is, since it has 3 components to its bullet: cup, core, steel penetrator.

5.56 NATO is over-pressured enough as it is to meet a 500yd steel helmet perforation requirement by the CONARC board in the late 1950's. The original chambering of .222 Remington had no problem perforating a steel helmet at 200, 300, and 400yds. Goal posts were moved because someone wasn't happy, and the 500yd fail point was reached, although it did penetrate the first layer of the helmet. This is why .222 Special was born, then re-named .223 Remington, and type-classified as 5.56 NATO.

The funny thing is if they had kept the .222 Remington case and just blown the shoulder forward without increasing the case length any, we could have had a case that would support much longer ogive projectiles, and there would be no need to single-load bullets like the 75gr A-MAX, 80gr Berger, 90gr VLD. Imagine a 90gr high BC pill in the SAW and DM carbines that beats most .308 target pills, and an armor-piercing construction would be a lot better than .30 bore because of sectional density.

[Tony Williams]

The funny thing is if they had kept the .222 Remington case and just blown the shoulder forward without increasing the case length any, we could have had a case that would support much longer ogive projectiles, and there would be no need to single-load bullets like the 75gr A-MAX, 80gr Berger, 90gr VLD. Imagine a 90gr high BC pill in the SAW and DM carbines that beats most .308 target pills, and an armor-piercing construction would be a lot better than .30 bore because of sectional density.

The basis of the case for adopting a .22 cal rifle was the combat studies which showed that nearly all small-arms fights took place within 300 yards. Within that range they thought light bullets fired at a high velocity would be fine, as they would maximise the hit probability while halving weight. They then seemed to lose confidence in this and started to demand longer-range performance, but it doesn't seem to have occurred to them that in that case, maybe a small .22 wasn't the best starting point.

[LRRPF52]

The basis of the case for adopting a .22 cal rifle was the combat studies which showed that nearly all small-arms fights took place within 300 yards. Within that range they thought light bullets fired at a high velocity would be fine, as they would maximise the hit probability while halving weight. They then seemed to lose confidence in this and started to demand longer-range performance, but it doesn't seem to have occurred to them that in that case, maybe a small .22 wasn't the best starting point.

The reliance on dumping energy into the target with the SCHV concept has as much merit as it does, as long as the bullet stays above fragmentation threshold, which is hard to extend range-wise with a lightweight and narrow projectile. 200yds is about right for any 20" gun with M193, and the carbines really don't suffer as much as is portrayed in the gun rags. The BC drives energy loss more than anything.

The hit probability was demonstrably increased in looking at entry-level shooting scores, who have basically no real recoil to deal with, and a very flat-shooting cartridge for distances out to 200m. Then there were the AGILE reports from initial fielding with ARVN units, with US Advisors in-tow, many of whom had a lot of combat experience from WWII and Korea. Everyone seemed to be impressed with the different wound ballistics 5.56 generated, and a lot of what I've seen first-hand supports the same type of wound characteristics.

Add to that the unprecedented combat load a soldier could carry, and 5.56 makes a lot of sense for most of your Infantry Riflemen to carry, especially in geographic regions where engagement distances were well within 200yds.

The real areas where the Army and DoD failed us were with the SAW's chambering, and letting Infantry Squads get TO&E'd out all with 5.56 weapons, while getting rid of the Squad Marksman, Scout, and Assistant Squad Leader, then adopting the stupid Train-Fire marksmanship program oriented to conscripts shooting from fighting positions in the defense with a Soviet Armored and Motorized Infantry threat rolling through the Fulda Gap. Of course, during the Cold War, it made sense to have focus on what was anticipated as the main threat, but there really needed to be at least a contingency force structure for all the wars and LIC's we have actually fought both during and after the Cold War.



The same is true today. I'm not seeing a lot of evidence that the Army has at least 2 coherent Force Postures other than demand-driven trends in OIF and OEF, particularly WRT IED-resistant vehicles that are inappropriate for a conventional war, the stupidity of cordon-and-search habits of heavy units in OIF, and the insanity of COPs in ISAF.

The only sensible small arms weapon system for an organization that refuses to allow talented and qualified officers to write doctrine is to reduce the weight of current systems, without sacrificing capability. A new standard service rifle/carbine won't do that, especially not in a larger caliber.

A new LMG that can displace some of the 7.62 belt-fed weapons with a lighter ammunition footprint would benefit even the worst offenders, no matter how illogical the chain of command and leadership climate was, because machine gunners will typically engage targets at longer distances and there is a system in-place that is mandated Army-wide to ensure they at least get transition range training, which is a fun range to shoot.

In short, we need a 3rd Generation LMG if anything, and the organization needs to support the recently-adopted TO&E of DM's in the Infantry Squad by creating a program to sustain the skill sets that DM's need to have to be as effective as they can be. The equipment comes after that.

[Michael]

Talking about the T/O WRT the T/E is a great discussion. The 13 man rifle squad has been around for a while in the Marines, but the battles we have been fighting over the last several years (and will probably continue to fight to some extent and the big land army battles are a thing for the operational planners to play with in the school house) have proven that there is not enough ass in the squad - hence all the ad-hoc T/O where you strap on a Human intel guy, CA, DM/sniper, J-TAC Etc. Puts an awful lot of moving parts on that young Sgt Sqd Ldr to manage after not training with those assets.

There was an experiment conducted several years ago called 'Distributed Operations' https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/FeatureTo...igned%20co.pdf that I had a part in. The two long poles in the tent were training and logistics. The young squad leader had not had the seasoning/military education to manage all of the assets he was given, and the standard military logistics system was woefully inadequate to supply small units all over the battlefield with any type of reliability or stealth.

[Tony Williams]

A new LMG that can displace some of the 7.62 belt-fed weapons with a lighter ammunition footprint would benefit even the worst offenders, no matter how illogical the chain of command and leadership climate was, because machine gunners will typically engage targets at longer distances and there is a system in-place that is mandated Army-wide to ensure they at least get transition range training, which is a fun range to shoot.

In short, we need a 3rd Generation LMG if anything, and the organization needs to support the recently-adopted TO&E of DM's in the Infantry Squad by creating a program to sustain the skill sets that DM's need to have to be as effective as they can be. The equipment comes after that.

I agree with that - the main advantage of a new long-range intermediate calibre would lie in reducing the weight of the portable MGs and ammunition carried by dismounted troops (see my post on another thread), with DMRs also benefitting. Having got that sorted, though, the advantages of a standard rifle/MG calibre within the squad, plus more reliable hitting power and penetration than 5.56mm, might well lead to a single-calibre squad.

[stanc]

The only sensible small arms weapon system for an organization that refuses to allow talented and qualified officers to write doctrine is to reduce the weight of current systems, without sacrificing capability. A new standard service rifle/carbine won't do that, especially not in a larger caliber.

A new LMG that can displace some of the 7.62 belt-fed weapons with a lighter ammunition footprint would benefit even the worst offenders, no matter how illogical the chain of command and leadership climate was...

In short, we need a 3rd Generation LMG if anything...

I'm inclined to agree with all that. I just think it's unlikely that a new caliber for an LMG can be adopted without also chambering the standard rifle/carbine in the same caliber.