New Army "Caliber Configuration Study"

[JASmith]

Nor should it. It's not the the job of the developers to write battlefield tactics. That's the job of the commanders in the field.

Agreed that developers do not have the job of writing battlefield tactics.

The development community, particularly analysts and lead designers, need to understand them and potential impacts the new system might have on the battlefield.

That expertise is needed both to be sure the design meets the stated and the implicit goals of the effort as well as in marketing the product.

[stanc]

Would you care to illuminate us on what close to 0.0 means? Single shot, burst, etc.

Per round. I haven't seen any info on hit probability per burst @ 1000 meters.

[cory]

Agreed that developers do not have the job of writing battlefield tactics.

The development community, particularly analysts and lead designers, need to understand them and potential impacts the new system might have on the battlefield.

That expertise is needed both to be sure the design meets the stated and the implicit goals of the effort as well as in marketing the product.

Agreed!

[stanc]

Nor should it. It's not the the job of the developers to write battlefield tactics. That's the job of the commanders in the field.

Okay. Do we know now if commanders in a future conflict would restrict a .338 MMG to specialized missions?

[cory]

Okay. Do we know now if commanders in a future conflict would restrict a .338 MMG to specialized missions?

LRRPF52 has explained this several pages ago. I won't touch on the Army SOPs as LRRPF52 explains it better than I can, as I have no experience there.

The Marine Corps SOPs I can explain. Each USMC Infantry Battalion has 3 Rifle companies, a Weapons Company, and H&S Company. For this sub-discussion only the Rifle companies are directly relevant.

Each Line Company has 4 Platoons - 3 Rifle Platoons and 1 Weapons Platoon.

The Weapons Platoon is made up of a MMG Section (currently M240s), a 60mm Mortars Section, and a Assault Section (SMAWS). Each of these sections are made up of Squads that implement their crew served weapons. These squads are attached to the Rifle Platoon/Squad/Team, normally on a per Mission Basis. They may on occasion be tasked out with a mission in support of the Rifle Platoon/Squad/Team.

It's not commanders of the future, this has been SOP for sometime.

http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCRP%205-12D%20Organization%20of%20Marine%20Corps%20Forces.pdf

We've seen the M240 issued at the Rifle Squad level in Afghanistan out of necessity, not as a Marine Corps SOP.

[cory]

Europe is going to be a big focal point for the next few decades, but Russia will play the chessboard very methodically, with patience.

We're basically at a stage where you go to war with the Army you have, not the one you want, although direct US involvement may be dubious at this point, especially considering the role of Germany becoming more friendly with Russia in a chaotic Europe.

I'm completely in favor of pulling troops and supplies out of Europe and letting Russia have at it.

[stanc]

We've seen the M240 issued at the Rifle Squad level in Afghanistan out of necessity, not as a Marine Corps SOP.

So, since the 7.62 MMG is being used routinely, and not being restricted to specialized missions, why should we think it would necessarily be any different if the 7.62 MMG is replaced by a .338 MMG?

[Michael]

JASmith – You are correct, there are a lot of conflicting pieces of data, and we in the military have historically tended to focus on the last war when designing our systems ant tactics. There have been some who looked ahead- or at the current situation- and went against the grain in their conduct of warfare (LGen ‘Brute’ Krulak and how Marines fought in I Corps in the mid-60s comes to mind, as does J-SOC forces in ‘01-‘02). We also have a tendency to focus on the enemies’, or perceived enemies’ Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) as opposed to the enemies’ Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). There is a growing group within the military and government that see the fallacy of fighting the last war – or preparing for the MDCOA at the expense of preparing for the MLCOA.

One of the classes I have taught over the last several years has been ‘Evolution of Warfare’. In that class we look at how warfare has evolved over the last 2000 years and where it is heading. I spent a lot of time doing research, reading and applying my own hard earned lessons learned in the process of educating the future officers. Based on a lot of reading, I have come to the following hypothesizes;

1) Full scale war – conventional or non-conventional - with an equal or near equal state competitor is unlikely. Global diplomacy, economies and information systems (three of the four areas of national power, the fourth being military) are too interconnected and interdependent. Again, it is unlikely, not impossible. I see this as the MDCOA. We still must be prepared for 3d generation warfare.
2) As of right now, no other nation state has the ability to project force to the extent of the U.S. . There are those who are trying, but it is not their focus of effort, and it is highly unlikely anyone will reach the potential to forward deploy a force of any size for at least 30 years. IE Invasion U.S.A. from a state actor doesn’t keep me up at night.
3) Unilateral action by a single nation state against a weaker state or non-state actor would have dramatic economic, diplomatic and military repercussions from the rest of the world. This is evident by current backlash against Russia.
4) Urban sprawl and discontent/poverty/class separation within the littoral regions of 3rd and 4th world nations (and it is encroaching into the traditional 1st world) will continue to impact global security, trade, travel and information sharing to the point a state actor – or group of state actors - will be forced to become involved (see the Arab Spring). As mentioned in point 2) we’re it when it comes to being able to project force, so it will most likely be a U.S. led/sponsored force.
5) Since the point of friction is the urban 3rd/4th world terrain, that is where we will most likely close with and fight the enemy. This terrain will be dominated by restricted maneuver and movement, and the enemy will most likely be non-state actors (may be funded/supported by agitator states) who hides among people who are neutral or non-participants. In order to maintain coalition and worldwide support, the state actors must be very judicious in the application of military power IOT avoid collateral damage, or turning a neutral party/person into an enemy by killing their family. This last scenario is, in the opinions of a lot of smart folks, the MLCOA for the future of our military operations and is considered 4th generation warfare.

So what does this mean? When you are talking MDCOA/3rd generation warfare, you are talking planes and missiles, with the possibility of large armored forces. When you are talking the MLCOA/4th generation warfare, you are talking about smaller lighter units on the ground – Reg/BN sized infantry units, SOF, maybe even some light armor.

In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.

[cory]

Michael first question how do we sign up for your class??? Very enlightening posts and good read thanks.

There's one scenario I think you left out or I'm just not connecting some dots. Our allies being attack/invaded by a neighboring country. i.e Israel by one of many neighbors, Japan by China, or South Korea by North Korea. Where do these scenarios fall into your hypothesis.

[cory]

One possibility I think we're completely overlooking is having a platform designed around 1 caliber and having multiple loads. This is already done with the 50 cal ammunition. You have ~a dozen different loadings. see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.50_BMG...artridge_types

Why can we not go with the 6.5 AR/LMG/DMR and .338 MMG/Sniper platforms with each having one or two loads (not counting tracers), with the production emphasis being whatever the MLCOA is at that time. For instance the 6.5mm could have a 95gr frangible round, a 115gr armor piercing round, and a 123gr HPBT DMR round. As long as all loads are relatively the same costs and can be adequately effective in all battlefields I don't see a problem with this.

Just a thought.

[JASmith]

...In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.

Many thanks for an informed and well-described summary of the major potential conflict scenarios.

[LRRPF52]

Soldier's load and logistics at the boot level will never justify going to a larger, heavier cartridge for most soldiers. Short story: 5.56 NATO and 5.45x39 are not going away anytime soon, especially considering what percentage of soldier's outside of combat units, as well as inside direct infantry units actually focus on closing with and destroying the enemy with small arms fire (not many of them).

The question then becomes, how do we increase the load-carrying capability of belt-fed weapons, to include vehicle-mounted ones, which do the most killing anyway.

Michael, thanks for your comments. They are an excellent summary of the concepts of force structuring and defense matters when taking a realistic view into account. The implications for dismounted and mounted blue force combatants turns away from 19th century regimentation structures, and really calls on organizational flexibility for mission types, ambiguities in regional, cultural, and political dynamics, with limited and precise application of violence in the events that call for it.

The underlying solutions to such a force structure really need to be addressed with organizational vision, training, and more training. I'm a supporter of a two-headed beast in terms of National and Expeditionary force structures:

* One is prepared to over match and defeat formal militaries anywhere in the world.

* The other is structured with a very long-term regional orientation, with highly-trained personnel who know the languages, cultures, and underlying currents of their assigned Areas of Operations at the Theater and Regional Levels.

It basically starts with a childhood training pipeline for those who know they are geared for the warrior and diplomatic class. It involves military-diplomatic schooling, including foreign language and cultural immersion programs, a constant program of studying geography, history, and martial subjects with half of the day focused on more cerebral modes, while the other half of the school day focuses on hands-on application of principles.

Our current military suffers from systemic leadership failures, and succeeds only because of a minority warrior class of professionals who have to fight the system to gain mission accomplishment, combined with the most powerful military industrial complex known to man.

It is hopeless to attempt to change the military from within using existing and outdated institutions, so you must start with the next generation of soldiers in the private sector, and build the leadership structure from outside before they enter. Give me half of the resources available to the initial entry, NCO development, Officer Training, and long-term professional development schools of the Army, and I will channel 10 times the soldier the government could ever hope to mentor and develop.

The standards that the Special Operations community demand from enlisted and officer candidates are what should be very baseline for entry-level combat arms enlisted, and officer duty positions, and the only way to accomplish that is in the private sector.

[stanc]

I spent a lot of time doing research, reading and applying my own hard earned lessons learned in the process of educating the future officers. Based on a lot of reading, I have come to the following hypothesizes...

Excellent post, Michael. I agree with pretty much the entirety of your analysis.

In trying to sum up some stuff, and get this thread back on track, I would recommend everyone who wants to talk about the future small arms/individual weapons of the future; Consider what will be most applicable in a non-permissive urban environment with a lot of neutral civilians to hide the bad guys. Big calibers with the ability to over-penetrate a target may not be the answer.

I doubt that a military rifle/MG ball round of any caliber won't pose an over-penetration hazard. Combat ammo needs to be capable of punching through barriers, with sufficient retained energy and momentum to be lethal. The requirement for barrier defeat capability is in direct opposition to the concern about over-penetration. IMO, it's unrealistic and pointless to be concerned about over-penetration.

[stanc]

One possibility I think we're completely overlooking is having a platform designed around 1 caliber and having multiple loads. This is already done with the 50 cal ammunition. You have ~a dozen different loadings.

Why can we not go with the 6.5 AR/LMG/DMR and .338 MMG/Sniper platforms with each having one or two loads (not counting tracers), with the production emphasis being whatever the MLCOA is at that time. For instance the 6.5mm could have a 95gr frangible round, a 115gr armor piercing round, and a 123gr HPBT DMR round. As long as all loads are relatively the same costs and can be adequately effective in all battlefields I don't see a problem with this.

It depends on what you have in mind. If a 6.5mm cartridge was adopted, you could count on many different loads being developed and adopted, just as with 7.62 NATO and every cartridge preceding it. At a minimum, there'd be:

- Ball
- Tracer
- AP
- HPBT
- Blank
- Dummy

If what you're getting at is issuing different loads for different areas -- for example, Frangible for house clearing, and HPBT for desert regions -- that is unlikely to happen. SOP is to issue one general purpose, standard ball round for rifles and machine guns, for use in all regions and operations.

[cory]

It depends on what you have in mind. If a 6.5mm cartridge was adopted, you could count on many different loads being developed and adopted, just as with 7.62 NATO and every cartridge preceding it. At a minimum, there'd be:

- Ball
- Tracer
- AP
- HPBT
- Blank
- Dummy

If what you're getting at is issuing different loads for different areas -- for example, Frangible for house clearing, and HPBT for desert regions -- that is unlikely to happen. SOP is to issue one general purpose, standard ball round for rifles and machine guns, for use in all regions and operations.

No I meant more of an Area of Operation. i.e. the HPBT would likely be the ideal round for Afghanistan. The Frangible or AP would be more of Gen III warfare AOs.